Finally, a(n understandable) Definition of Rhetoric!
Quintilian gives us, I believe, the most comprehensible (and comprehensive) definition of rhetoric by situating it, as he does, alongside the definitions found in Plato, Aristotle, Isocrates, and Cicero. In Book 2, Chapter 14, Quintilian concludes that “Rhetoric…will be best divided…in such a manner that we may speak first of the art, next of the artist, and then of the work” and that the primary objective of rhetoric is “good speaking” (2.14.5) Quintilian then begins to unpack the various definitions and associations that the writers that have come before him have made: “All these [Plato, Aristotle, Isocrates, and Cicero] have generally supposed that the business of oratory lies either in persuading or in speaking in a manner adapted to persuade…The most common definition therefore is that oratory is the power of persuading” (2.15.3). Cicero’s definition of rhetoric, like the Greek definitions, focus on perusasion: “Rhetoric is one great art comprised of five lesser arts: inventio, disposition, elocutio, memoria, and pronunciation,” for rhetoric is "speech designed to persuade” (1.31).
Quintilain then, connecting back to his definition from chapter 14, suggests that this definition is misleading. He agrees with Cicero that rhetoric is, at least in part, the performance of civil polity and suggests that the best definition of oratory “is the science of speaking well…for it embraces all the virtues of oratory at once and includes also the character of the true orator, as he cannot speak well unless he be a good man” (2.15.33-34).
Quintilian and Cicero love Isocrates but not Philosophy
The thing, I think, which unites Cicero and Quintilian, and which sets them in opposition to Plato and Aristotle, is the place of philosophy as it relates to rhetoric and/or oratory. According to Plato, Rhetoric, or Oratory, is but a minor footnote to the practice of philosophy, the search for truth. Cicero and Quintilian, on the other hand, argue that oratory is its own field, a “science” unto itself (Cicero 1.12). For these teachers of rhetoric, philosophy is but one of the tools available to the orator. He may use philosophy in service of his rhetoric, but his rhetoric does not exclusively serve philosophy.
Quintilian points out that “Cicero remarks that the power of eloquence is to be derived from the deepest sources of wisdom, and that accordingly the same persons,” that is, the philosophers, “were for a considerable time the teachers at once of eloquence and of morality” (Quintilian 12.2.6). However, Quintilian says, he is not arguing that orators should be philosophers, not only because such teachers of philosophy dramatically undervalued oratory but also because “no other mode of life has withdrawn itself further from the duties of civil society and all that concerns the orator” (Quintilian 12.2.6). In Quintilian’s practice of rhetoric, the orator is almost exclusively concerned with civil discourse: all oratory takes place before the public in service of causes that serve the public good, and because philosophy is not concerned with this contextual public good, it is not as useful as the Greeks claimed it to be.
Likewise, Cicero, in all three of the books of De Oratore, discusses the relationship between philosophy and rhetoric. In Book 2, for example, Antonius notes that he has spent very little time studying philosophy and that, in fact, too much philosophy could be dangerous to the orator because it may influence his oratory in such a way that his knowledge of philosophy makes his argument seem artificial, which could diminish his authority with the judges or the audience (2.37). In this section, the main thrust of Antonius’ argument is related to the importance of appealing to the audience’s emotions. Antonius’ contention is that philosophy is largely unnecessary for such appeals and is therefore of limited value to the orator, who must always appeal to the emotions of the audience.
These authors do not deny the possibility that rhetoric can be used for bad ends, however. They acknowledge the issues that Plato, Aristotle, and even Isocrates, had with rhetoric in the hands of one without the proper virtue; their refrain, however, is that while such men could indeed try to use oratory, they could never be true orators, for an orator is first good and then capable of giving good speeches.
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